|
|
|
||||||||
|
||||||||||
|
Do the subjects in Hobbes's commonwealth retain their liberty?In the state of nature, we have complete liberty. Anything and everything is permitted (Pike, p85 also AC2). We may acquire and possess anything we require or desire by any means available. Of course, everyone else has the same liberties, including the liberty to take anything that is ours. According to Hobbes, this would inevitably lead to a state of war of everyone against everyone. To avoid this state some of our liberties must be sacrificed. Hobbes proposes that in the formation of a commonwealth the subjects' right to govern themselves should be transferred in entirety to the sovereign, who then has absolute power. From this it seems clear that subjects in Hobbes's commonwealth do not retain their liberty. "The right of nature, that is, the natural liberty of man, may by the civil law be abridged and restrained" (chXXVI [8], p175). However, true liberty can only be achieved in a state of perfect anarchy, i.e. the state of nature. Any commonwealth must impose laws, and therefore must deprive its subjects of liberty. It would be uncharitable to single out Hobbes, despite his authoritarian stance. Instead we should consider a selection of less idealistic but more practical ideas of liberty, and see how free the subjects of Hobbes's commonwealth appear in light of them. Hobbes himself defines liberty as "the absence of external impediments" (chXIV [2], p79). He allows for "artificial" bonds such as the bonds of laws (chXXI [5], p138) as being equally impeding as physical bonds. A man under house arrest is no more free than a man chained in a cell, as neither has the liberty to leave. This liberty to leave is one liberty that Hobbes's subjects do not retain. The social contract as espoused by Hobbes cannot be exited. A subject can never escape the sovereign's power. "none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection" (XVIII [4], p111). The subjects surrender their right to govern themselves, and in turn are obligated not to interfere with the sovereign's ability to govern them (chXIV [7], p81). They do this on the condition that all other subjects do the same. To opt out of the commonwealth is to break the contract. If there is any chance that one subject may break the contract, then the other subjects would pre-emptively break the contract in order to protect themselves, and we would return to the state of nature. For the commonwealth to remain, subjects cannot be allowed to leave (XVIII [3], p110-111). They do not retain their liberty. They are imprisoned in citizenship. This imprisonment is exacerbated by the fact that subjects may not have consented to becoming subjects. Consent is essential for liberty. If I am compelled to do something against my will, this necessarily implies I am being impeded from doing what I wish, contrary to Hobbes's own definition of liberty. If I am compelled to become a subject, I do not retain my liberty. When a child is born, they are subject to the state because their mother is (chXX [6], p130). The child owes obligation to its mother because she gave it life and nourishment, yet gives no consent to becoming a subject. When the commonwealth is initially formed, even those who initially vote against it must become subjects. Their participation in the voting process obliges them to accept the outcome (chXVIII [1], p110) Even if a person does consent to becoming a subject, if another state invades and conquers the commonwealth, he becomes subject to the conquering power. Not only has he not chosen the new sovereign but if he fought a war it implies he actively chose against it (chXX [2], p127-128). If liberty requires consent, then Hobbes's subjects do not retain their liberty. While imprisonment is always a loss of liberty, house arrest is preferable to a cell. If I must be imprisoned in citizenship, can I at least choose the nature of my jail? Unfortunately, Hobbes subjects lack this liberty also. Once the sovereign is in place it is permanent, and the citizens are powerless to change it. Even with the death of the sovereign, or of a member of the sovereign assembly, the subjects have no power to choose a successor. "There is no perfect form of government where the disposing of the succession is not in the present sovereign" (chXIX [13], p124). A monarch nominates his heir, an aristocracy appoints new members, even a democracy carries no assumptions of free elections. For Hobbes, "democracy" simply means that any subject may become a member of the assembly. The idea of Parliament being dissolved and re-formed every few years is contrary to the permanent stability that is the intention of Hobbes's commonwealth (chXIX [15], p124). This is not to say that an elective government is impossible. Hobbes allows for contractual competitions (chXIV [17], p83-84), so the assembly could theoretically declare that members be periodically determined by free election, but it is not obliged to do so. "none have the right to give that which they have not the right to possess and keep" (XIX [11], p123). If the assembly has the right to call an election, it also has the right to remain in power indefinitely. While much depends on the sovereign, if liberty means a modern elective democracy, then Hobbes's subjects do not retain their liberty (AC2). Hobbes's definition of liberty is compatible with that of "negative" liberty as described by Isaiah Berlin, in which liberty is defined by the number of options available. However, one must know that the options exist. To conceal knowledge of the options is equivalent to restricting the options themselves. Negative liberty requires freedom of information, yet this is another liberty Hobbes subjects do not retain. "It is annexed to the sovereign to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse", and "... shall examine the doctrines of all books before they are published" (chXVIII [9], p113). A benevolent sovereign may allow information to be distributed without significant interference. However, allowing overt dissension and subversion is directly contrary to Hobbes ideas. He even claimed that the most destructive influence on the stability of the state had been the reading of classical republican discourses (AC2). Again, while much is dependent on the sovereign, if one believes that liberty must include freedom of speech, then Hobbes's subjects do not retain their liberty. John Stuart Mill proposed a single unifying Liberty Principle: the Principle of Harm. This says that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over a [subject] is to prevent harm to others" (quoted in Wolff, p115). Hobbes might have argued that anything that weakens the sovereign's authority brings us closer to the state of nature. This is a great harm to all subjects, thus the sovereign may rightfully exercise power to prevent it. If you accept this argument, then the subjects in fact do retain their liberty. Another liberty Hobbes's subjects do retain is one denied in many modern democracies. He maintains throughout that we are all equal. His 9th and 11th laws of nature state this explicitly (XV [21 and 23], p96-97). In fact his views on the state of nature rely on this equality. While women, racial minorities and the under-classes may be no more free than the dominant class, at least they are no less. If liberty means equality, Hobbes's subject do retain their liberty. Hobbes himself allows for two important liberties to be retained by subjects. A subject is justified to oppose the sovereign if he is ordered to kill or injure himself (or to passively allow himself to be killed or injured). He also cannot be compelled to confess to a crime unless he is promised a pardon, because to do so would be to bring punishment upon himself (XXI [12-13], p142, also AC2). At first glance these are very specific liberties, and yet critics of Hobbes have used them to portray Leviathan as a "rebel's catechism". The argument is as follows: Who decides whether or not the sovereign is compromising my ability to preserve myself? It can't be the sovereign, as it would be nonsensical to make a decree and then immediately render it void by saying it threatens me. As no-one else can claim authority over me, I alone can make that judgement, but if I can decide for myself when I should or shouldn't obey the sovereign then in effect the sovereign is ruling at my pleasure (Hampton, p127). However, it is quite a stretch to take what is little more than a loophole and claim it permits arbitrary rebellion. If the sovereign exercises his right to execute me, I retain the liberty to rebel. However, if I invoke this liberty against an act that does not threaten me (raising taxes on goods I never buy, banning a book I'll never read, etc.) then I am quite simply wrong. It is as unjust of me as if I'd broken the law. It is important to note also that I do not retain this liberty if it would threaten the state. In the event of war, the sovereign may conscript me to fight. This threatens my life and I have the liberty to refuse, but only if I can ensure that it would not compromise the commonwealth's defence, e.g. if I found someone to take my place. (XXI [16], p142). Also note that even if I am justified in rebelling, the sovereign still retains the right to execute me for it. "though his sovereign have right enough to punish his refusal with death, [a subject] may nevertheless in many cases refuse without injustice" (XXI [16], p142). If liberty means freedom to dissent then, contrary to Bramhill and Hampton, Hobbes's subjects do not retain their liberty. Hobbes's model rests on the belief that any commonwealth is preferable to the state of nature. The sovereign may perform any atrocity it wishes if it can justify it on the grounds of national security, up to and including the execution of an innocent man (XXI [7], p139). Hobbes specifically says that no action by the sovereign can invalidate the social contract (XVIII [4], p111, also AC2). Because the sovereign is acting as our representative, all its actions are morally equivalent to us performing them ourselves. To dissent against one's own actions, or to claim actions against oneself are unjust is absurd (AC2). One could even argue that, as the sovereign is free to act as it sees fit, then we are acting as we see fit, and thus we have complete liberty. This is a dangerous argument though, comparable to Rousseau's claim that we can be forced to be free. It could be used to justify any oppression the sovereign can invent. However, oppression is not mandatory. Under the auspices of a benevolent dictator, subjects might enjoy happiness and freedom. The question is, does absolute power corrupt absolutely? Can we expect the sovereign to behave reasonably? History would seem to suggest not. In conclusion, while some useful liberties are preserved, Hobbes denies subjects a number of liberties we might consider important if not fundamental. Beyond these, the subjects in Hobbes's commonwealth retain exactly as much liberty as the sovereign decrees. Bibliography
|
|
Except where stated, this site and its contents are copyright ©2009 Alec Harkness and licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.5 License.