"All concern with equality in distributive justice is either a misidentified concern with something else or an unreasonable concern with an empty shibboleth."
Do you agree?

Equality seems an intuitively good thing. We look at the obvious inequalities in the world between the super-rich and those in poverty and we are naturally appalled. However, as with so much in philosophy, when we examine the issue in detail we see that it is not as clear-cut as it seems.

In this essay, I shall show how an apparent concern with relative inequality can in fact be a misidentified concern with absolute hardship. I shall then go on to show that concern with equality as an end unto itself is itself misguided, and conclude by showing that inequality can be a good thing. First though, we need to clarify some terminology.

Equality and egalitarianism

"Equality" can cover a number of concepts. Sexual equality, racial equality and suchlike are relatively easy to defend. In fact, equality in this sense is not so much a position as a lack of a position. As soon as we claim that group X is in some way superior to group Y, we are taking a position, and are therefore obliged to defend it. Equality in this sense is merely not taking a position on who is superior to who.

However, in this essay I am concerned only with equality within distributive justice. While theories of distributive justice often take equality as the hypothesised starting point (e.g. Locke's state of nature, or Rawls' original position) we are here dealing with equality as the end goal. The question we're asking is if equality is as desirable a goal as is assumed.

We should make a distinction between those who claim equality is a goal unto itself ("telic" egalitarians) and those who claim equality is desirable only for its instrumental value, as a means to some other end ("deontic" egalitarians) [Parfit, 1997]. We are here concerned only with telic egalitarianism. Even if we show that equality has no intrinsic worth, it remains possible that the quest for equality has value as a method for achieving some other worthwhile goal.

Amongst telic egalitarians we can make a further division between "strong" egalitarians who maintain that equality has value above all else, and "moderate" egalitarians who concede that the value of equality can be outweighed by other factors. While I will have occasion to note this distinction, I hope ultimately my arguments will cover both.

Finally, we need to acknowledge that there are various ways to measure equality. One of the great questions amongst egalitarians is "equality of what?" [Arneson 2002; Arneson 2007]. Also, an apparently equal share may be more valuable to some people than to others depending on their needs and circumstances. Ensuring everyone has a boat is of little use to those who don't live near water. Accounting for these differences results in more subtle and complex interpretations of equality. Rather than simply considering equal resources, one might perhaps consider equal welfare, or capabilities, or equal life satisfaction. I shall largely restrict myself to a fairly abstract notion of equality, amongst people with similar needs, but will return to this point.

So, let us consider how concern for equality is often in fact concern for something else.

Equality as misidentified concern

Equality concerns the state of one person relative to another. If one considers the state of the very poor compared to the very rich, one sees a gross inequality and tends to think it grossly unjust. However, it is not the inequality that is the problem.

Consider the inequality that exists in Britain between the classes. You may think it terrible that I am sitting here with my expensive hi-fi and decent laptop, while just down the road there are people who are struggling to put food on the table. Their plight may indeed be bad, but it would be bad whether or not I had an expensive hi-fi.

Now compare the inequality between poor and comfortably off with the far greater inequality between the comfortably off and the very rich. No-one thinks it is terrible that the very rich drink Dom Pérignon while I can only afford Jacob's Creek.

It is not relative wealth that is the issue, but absolute wealth. The plight of the poor is terrible because they are poor, not because some other person is rich. If the rich person is made less rich, inequality is lessened but the plight of the poor is unchanged. If rich person and poor person are both made equally richer, inequality is unchanged but the plight of the poor is lessened. If we were to live in a utopian state where resources were plentiful and nobody lived in want of anything, it would seem strange to complain of inequality. If I have all I want, why should I be bothered that someone else has more? [Compare Frankfurt's "Doctrine of Sufficiency", esp. Frankfurt §V]

This confusion between absolute and relative is not confined to matters of wealth. An oft-cited example is Nagel's story of a family with two children, one of whom is disabled. Faced with the choice of living in the city - where the disabled child can receive greater care - or the suburbs - where the able-bodied child will be happier, Nagel maintains that the disabled child gets priority because this would reduce inequality. However, the disabled child deserves care whether or not he has an able bodied sibling. This is in fact more of a question of prioritisation [Parfit, 1997, §5; also Frankfurt §VI].

Another common concern is the inequality of the oppressed and powerless. While powerlessness is an absolute condition, it is also often the result of oppression by someone with greater power. Therefore it is not wholly covered by our absolute/relative discussion. However, some of the points made still apply.

Comparing inequalities remains useful. Consider the oppression of the shop-floor steward over the labourer compared to the greater oppression of the tyrant over the steward. The oppressor is himself oppressed, but we are less sympathetic, which implies that it is oppression that is considered bad, not inequality per se.

While the plight of the oppressed could be improved by removing power from the oppressors, the issue is not inequality but power and the abuse thereof. Their plight could be improved by taking power from the oppressor and transferring it unchanged to a more worthy person, even though inequality remains constant [Frankfurt, §II].

These arguments are examples of a Person Affecting view, i.e. that the only considerations worth discussing are ones that directly affect persons. The counter to this view is that certain values are intrinsically worthy regardless of their effect or lack thereof [Pike, p33; Parfit]. My next task therefore is to show that there is no intrinsic value to equality.

Equality as Empty Shibboleth

In our example earlier, we saw that the plight of the poor is unaffected if inequality is reduced by making the richer worse off. This is an example of Levelling Down, and is one of the main arguments against egalitarianism. The argument goes that if the rich are made worse off while the poor remain unaffected, then even though inequality has been reduced, no good has come of it and therefore equality has no value by itself.

Suppose there was a particularly brutal revolution (such as the French Revolution), and all the wealthy people are rounded up and executed and their possessions burnt. The only people left are poor people. Equality has been attained but nobody is better off. To claim that because we now have equality the world is a better place, and that mass murder is therefore justified, seems implausible at best [Parfit, §4; Arneson (2007), §5.2].

There are other scenarios in which equality is undesirable, for instance when vital resources are scarce. Imagine a lethal disease that is curable with a course of medicine. If ten people have this disease, but there is only enough medicine for five complete courses, it's no use trying to distribute the medicine equally. All that would happen is that no-one would get a complete course, and thus everyone would die [Frankfurt, §IV].

It would take a particularly uncompromising egalitarian to maintain that equality was an absolute good in the face of these examples. However, more moderate egalitarians will concede that while equality is a good thing, sometimes its value is outweighed by other considerations. This would certainly be an effective counter to the arguments so far given. We need a scenario where equality is bad (or inequality is good) and there are no other considerations.

Imagine an island paradise where true equality has been achieved. Everyone has equal health, wealth and happiness. One day an islander is walking along the beach and finds some shells. He takes them home and fashions them into jewellery which he wears. He is now marginally more attractive (or at least more adorned) than the other islanders. An inequality has been introduced.

Other islanders are inspired. They in turn go to the beach, or the forest, or the mountains, and find their own individual ways of decorating themselves and their homes. Inequality becomes widespread, and everyone is happier.

To restore equality would mean taking all these personalisations and destroying them. This kind of gross enforcement of equality merely for its own sake cannot be justified. It also introduces questions about the unequal power of those doing the enforcing [Arneson 2002, p92].

Examples of this sort illustrate how free choice invariably leads to inequality, and enforcing equality conflicts with liberties and rights [Nozick, 1974; also Arneson, 2007, §3.3].

A typical counter argument is to claim that prioritising rights over equality is a kind of "rights fanaticism" [Pike, p31]. This may be true if we insist on strong Lockean property rights. However, in my example I have deliberately avoided any assumption of property rights. Defending one's right to pick shells is surely less fanatical than insisting on equality above all else.

It might be argued that I am confusing inequality with variety. A moderate egalitarian would hence be able to argue that the benefits of variety outweigh the value of equality. I would counter this by saying that inequality is variation, specifically variation that is valued.

Any variation between two things can be expressed as "Entity 1 is more XYZ than Entity 2" (e.g. "Islander 1 is more adorned than islander 2"). This variation becomes an inequality if property XYZ is in some way valued, as "more XYZ" then becomes an evaluation of superiority. The personalisations of the islanders are, ex hypothesi, valued. Therefore personalisation not only requires inequality, but is identical with inequality.

Another counter would be to evoke a more subtle understanding of equality, such as equality of happiness. It could then be argued that once all the islanders had personalised themselves, equality has been restored. There is variety of adornment, but not variety of happiness as everyone is equally content. Thus we'd then be able to maintain that the initial inequality of the single islander adorning himself is outweighed by the benefit of inspiring his fellow islanders to greater happiness.

In this case I would counter that the inequality is not being balanced by some other benefit, but the inequality itself is a benefit. This would remain the case with any inequality that led to a general improvement, regardless of how one measured equality.

The only other counter I can imagine is a measure of equality of such subtlety that a beneficial change is not classed as an inequality at all. While I can imagine such a counter, I cannot imagine what form it would take.

Conclusion

There is great inequality in the world, and often it is the result of great injustice. It is naturally tempting to want to correct the injustice by restoring equality. What I hope I have demonstrated is the danger of confusing legitimate concerns with a concern for equality. I hope I have also demonstrated that equality in itself has no intrinsic value, and that inequality can be a good thing.

Bibliography

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