If evolutionary psychology is correct, then the apparently selfless acts most of us occasionally perform are not genuinely selfless.

If we restructure this conditional as an argument, and insert the implied premise, we might get something resembling the following:

1. Our psychological makeup evolved through natural selection (i.e. evolutionary psychology is correct).
2. Natural selection cannot produce anything genuinely selfless.
3. Therefore, the apparently selfless acts most of us occasionally perform are not genuinely selfless

A selfless act could be defined as any act performed without the expectation of reward, or more strongly as an act performed at cost to oneself without the expectation of reward. Evolutionary psychology claims that our natures are determined entirely by evolution by natural selection through a process of survival of the fittest. So are genuinely selfless acts precluded by natural selection, in which even the slightest disadvantage can make the difference between survival and extinction?

Evolution itself is simply a process of random mutation, so there is no reason why a genuinely selfless being could not randomly evolve. What is more of a question is whether this being would survive the harsh realities of natural selection? Such a being would be at a disadvantage, performing acts that benefited others more than itself, while other more selfish beings performed only acts that were directly advantageous, perhaps even exploiting the selfless being.

Certainly this was the view suggested by classical Darwinism, and it does at first glance seem that genuine selflessness cannot evolve successfully. However many animals do perform at least apparently selfless acts: e.g. a mother sacrificing herself to save her child, or a worker bee sacrificing itself to save its queen. While it could be argued that the human might have an ulterior motive, this becomes far-fetched when talking about social insects. So, are these acts genuinely selfless?

With the advent of genetics an explanation was found. Rather than evolution being about survival of the fittest individual, it became about survival of the fittest gene. The gene produces characteristics in animals, and natural selection sorts out those animals whose characteristics most successfully serve to propagate the gene. In general, success for the gene implies success for the individual, but this is not necessarily the case. Genes might produce any number of characteristics that are not necessarily beneficial for the individual, but serve to multiply the genes. Could this include selfless behaviour? Consider two forms of apparent selflessness: reciprocal altruism and kin-directed altruism.

Reciprocal altruism is an act performed to promote a general feeling of goodwill that may promote returned favours in the future. This can easily be imagined to be a successful evolutionary strategy, even without gene machines.

Consider the prisoner's dilemma as discussed in Book 3. On an individual basis it is always in one's apparent interest to desert one's post, even though this will generally lead to a less favourable outcome. Co-operating and remaining and one's post is in one's interest only if one can be sure the other party will do the same. Here a sense of reciprocal altruism is desirable. In creatures that were frequently presented with situations analogous to this scenario, genes that promoted reciprocally altruistic behaviour would be more successful at getting reproduced. Thus creatures with feelings of altruism would evolve.

Consider the Tit-for-Tat machine, also discussed in Book 3. After initially being helpful it responded to the actions of others reciprocally. In Axelrod's tournament, this proved the most successful strategy, so it is not unreasonable to imagine it being successful in nature. A society of tit-for-tat creatures would tend to perform apparently selfless acts as they could expect others in the society to reciprocate.

It could be argued that these acts are not genuinely selfless, as they are performed with some expectation of reciprocal reward. This would be the case if we were talking about arrangements made between selfish creatures, such as the Chukchee that Barash refers to [pp207-208], but we are considering the metaphorical selfishness of genes. The genes are not expecting rewards, and do not in any way "act" in anticipation of rewards.

If our genetic makeup has made us inclined towards selflessness, it is because selfless acts have proven evolutionarily beneficial in the past. It may be that genuinely selfless acts in fact prove to be of greater benefit than acts performed with ulterior motives, for instance by motivating a greater sense of gratitude in the beneficiary. If genuine selflessness consistently brings greater rewards, then the strategy would prove evolutionarily successful, and the genes that caused this behaviour would be reproduced.

Just because an act proved to be beneficial does not necessarily mean the act was performed selfishly. A person may perform a genuinely selfless act. If she is then rewarded it does not negate the selflessness. This is especially true if the reward benefits the genes, but not the individual, as in the case of a mother's self-sacrifice for a child.

Kin-directed altruism can be seen in nature very clearly with social insects such as bees, ants and termites. Individuals will sacrifice themselves for the good of queen and colony. For the individual, this makes no evolutionary sense, but when considered on a genetic level it becomes easier to explain. A worker sacrifices its life, and the queen lives on to spread more copies of the gene [p202].

This also accounts for the mother protecting her child. While a situation in which the mother actually dies is not beneficial to the genes - after all she may have lived to create more copies - in general it is a good emotion to develop. Protectiveness in a mother will help ensure the survival of the offspring. The greater the protectiveness, the greater the chances of its survival.

So is this true selflessness, or is it merely the selfish gene manipulating its gigantic lumbering robot? To start asserting that we are mere puppets enslaved to our genes is to fall into the trap of assigning real motives to them. Genes are not active participants in evolution. Evolution occurs entirely as a result of random chance with no motivating force behind it whatsoever. The phrase "selfish gene" is intended purely as a metaphor, and we must not lose sight of this.

However, even if we entertain the idea of genes actually having motives, and having purposefully constructed gigantic lumbering robots that have a sense of selfless altruism, that does not detract from what the robots feel. A mother rushing in front of a speeding bus to save her child may well be doing so because her genetic makeup dictates it, but this does not alter what she has done, or why she has done it. She would no doubt act just as selflessly if there were no chance of it benefiting her genes, for example if the child was sterile, or simply did not posses the selfless gene.

This is an example of shifting the level of the question, from whether or not we can experience selflessness to what is the cause of this apparent selflessness [p221]. The cause in no way affects the truth. If we are (or are not) truly selfless, then how we became that way is an entirely separate question.

As an analogy, consider a table. The table is solid. We know that the table is made up of atoms. We then find out that atoms are over 90% empty space. However, this does not stop the table from being solid. Indeed, no matter what bizarre properties we may discover about the nature of atoms and quantum particles, the table will always be solid.

Similarly, no matter what strange and unpalatable truths we may discover about how we came to be as we are, it will not affect the actuality of what we are. Evolutionary psychology may or may not be true. It does not affect whether we are or are not capable of genuinely selfless acts.

So are we capable of selfless acts? To a degree, this can be determined empirically. Controlled experiments are conducted where reward is either assured or impossible, and the participants' actions are observed. In such experiments, it turns out that selfless behaviour can be observed [p193]. If these results are accepted, then according to the last paragraph evolutionary psychology provides an explanation for the phenomena, not a debunk.

It would appear then that evolutionary psychology allows for the possibility of selfless behaviour, but is this behaviour truly selfless? A mother sacrificing herself for her child may appear to be the ultimate expression of selflessness, but if she had stood idly by while her child was killed, she would be traumatised for life. We could argue that the mother is simply sparing herself the trauma, and so is acting in her own interests.

However if we do, we fall into another trap by saying that any action we take in order to avoid future feelings of remorse cannot be selfless. This is not a question of acting in our own interests, but acting in accordance with our own wishes, which is not the same thing. It implies that any action we perform of our own volition - i.e. any action not induced by insanity, hypnosis, or some form of direct external control - is necessarily selfish. This in turn implies that no act can ever be selfless. We have defined selflessness out of existence along with two-horned unicorns and dehydrated water [p217]. We cannot blame evolutionary psychology for that.

Let us consider the alternative - the social science, or "blank paper" model. If we can show that this model leads to exactly the same conclusions (or lack thereof) then we have shown that the issue does not turn on the truth or otherwise of evolutionary psychology.

Social science claims that our natures are determined entirely by environmental factors such as our society and upbringing. Our society places a high value on selflessness and charity. Selfish acts may be regarded as immoral or criminal, and may be punishable offences. Charitable acts may be rewarded by celebrity status or honours from the Queen. Add the complications of religion with its promises of eternal rewards or punishments in the hereafter, and one has quite compelling motives to be apparently selfless.

For those of us brought up in such a society, it could be argued that the apparently selfless acts we perform are not truly selfless. Rather they are performed in the hope of the rewards that society promises, or to avoid the punishments it threatens. While this could be probably argued and dismissed the point remains that social science is subject to the same issues about whether selfless acts can or cannot truly exist.

We have demonstrated that the existence of genuinely selfless acts does not turn on the non-truth of evolutionary psychology. We have also shown that the truth of evolutionary psychology does not necessarily preclude the existence of selfless acts. Therefore it is not true to say that if evolutionary psychology is correct, then the apparently selfless acts most of us occasionally perform are not genuinely selfless.

Bibliography

Course Texts
• Book 3 - Environments, Ethics and Human Concern
• Book 4 - Human Nature after Darwin.
• Cassette 3, side 2, band 1 - Conditionals and TMAs